McCann v Crown Prosecution Service

For an offence of wilfully obstructing a constable, the constable must be acting in good faith in pursuit of a proper policing purpose. The conduct must be lawful. Where no specific power is being exercised, the officer’s conduct must be rational in the Wednesbury sense. The officer need not have the correct offence in mind, provided that the steps taken reasonably appear necessary to prevent crime on the facts as the officer reasonably understands them. The relevant focus is the state of mind and conduct of the officer directly involved, including whether reliance on information from others was genuine and reasonable. An erroneous statutory explanation does not necessarily take the officer outside the execution of her duty.

The appellant was convicted by District Judge Clarke in the Manchester and Salford Magistrates’ Court of wilfully obstructing a constable in the execution of her duty, contrary to section 89(2) of the Police Act 1996. She had joined a protest on a private access road with a public footpath and refused an inspector’s direction to move, given on the mistaken basis that the route was a public highway.

The prosecution later admitted that the road was private. The Case Stated raised questions concerning the officer’s mistake about the road’s status, the offence in contemplation, reasonable grounds for suspicion, and the scope of the officer’s duty. On appeal, the appellant relied principally on the alleged unreasonableness of the mistake and on the possibility of aggravated trespass.

1. Appeal dismissed. The inspector was acting in the execution of her duty when she directed the appellant to move.
2. The relevant inquiry concerned the actions and intentions of the inspector who gave the direction, not whether other officers who briefed her had acted reasonably. Her belief that the road was a public highway, and her suspicion that an offence was being committed, were genuine and reasonable in the circumstances.
3. The court adopted the formulation in Rice v Connolly, [1966] 3 WLR 17, with the qualification that the steps taken to prevent crime must reasonably appear necessary to the officer. The officer’s duty requires a proper policing purpose and good faith. The conduct must be lawful. If force or a specific statutory power is used, it must satisfy the applicable statutory and common-law requirements. If no specific power is being exercised, the conduct must be rational in the Wednesbury sense.
4. The inspector’s request to clear the route was not prima facie an unlawful interference with liberty or property. The fact that she identified the wrong statutory offence did not matter. Following the principles concerning the absence of technicality in identifying an offence in Christie v Leachinsky, [1947] AC 573, and Chapman v DPP, [1989] 89 Cr App R 190, it was sufficient that the steps reasonably appeared necessary to prevent crime on the facts as she believed them.
5. The court did not need to determine whether aggravated trespass under section 68 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 had been made out. Questions concerning that issue were left unanswered as unnecessary.

• High Court (Administrative Court): McCann v Crown Prosecution Service, [2015] EWHC 2461 (Admin). Appeal by way of Case Stated dismissed; the conviction and absolute discharge were upheld.
• Manchester and Salford Magistrates’ Court: District Judge Clarke convicted the appellant on 23 September 2014 of wilfully obstructing a constable contrary to section 89(2) of the Police Act 1996.