Nursing and Midwifery Council v Mullings

When deciding whether to extend an interim suspension order imposed on a registered healthcare professional, the court should consider the gravity of the allegations, the risk of harm to patients, the reasons for delay, and the prejudice caused by continuation of the order. The regulator bears the burden of justifying continuation. An extension may be granted where it remains necessary for public protection and is otherwise in the public interest, provided the additional period is justified and proportionate to the anticipated progress of the substantive proceedings.

The Nursing and Midwifery Council applied under article 31(8) of the Nursing and Midwifery Order 2001 for a four-month extension of an interim suspension order imposed on Rebecca Mullings. The underlying allegations concerned a police caution for theft of medication and possession with intent to supply codeine. The substantive disciplinary hearing was listed for 23 March 2016. The respondent had been properly served but did not attend or oppose the application. The central issue was whether continuation of the interim order was justified pending the substantive hearing.

1. The application was granted. The interim suspension order was extended for four months and was to expire on 25 June 2016. The respondent retained permission to apply to vary or discharge the order on giving notice.
2. The applicable principles were those identified in GMC v Dr Hiew [2007] EWCA Civ 369. The court considered:
   1. the gravity of the allegations;
   2. the seriousness of the risk of harm to patients;
   3. the reasons why the case had not yet concluded; and
   4. the prejudice to the practitioner if the order continued.
3. The burden lay on the Council to justify continuation. The allegations were serious because they involved an alleged breach of trust and abuse of the respondent’s position. The alleged conduct was said to have continued for eight months, and the committee had identified a risk of repetition. Continued suspension was therefore necessary for public protection.
4. Progress had been made in the regulatory proceedings and the final hearing was imminent. No evidence of actual prejudice had been provided. Any further prejudice from four additional months was likely to be minimal, particularly because the Council had sought the period as a precaution against an adjournment and to avoid the need for a further court application.
5. Taking all matters into account, the extension was justified, necessary to protect the public, and otherwise in the public interest.

This was the first occasion on which the matter came before the court. No prior appellate decision was stated.