Doka v London Borough of Southwark

Intentional homelessness under the Housing Act 1996 involves two inquiries. The applicant must have deliberately ceased to occupy accommodation that was available and reasonable to continue occupying, and that conduct must have caused the present homelessness. A later event may break the causal chain.

Settled accommodation can break that chain. Whether accommodation is settled is a question of fact and degree. A licence may qualify, and legal form is not decisive. The essential questions are whether there was a real prospect of continuation for a significant or indefinite period and whether the applicant’s security was at least comparable to the previous position. Length alone is insufficient. Accommodation may remain precarious where the licensor retains priority and the applicant must leave on foreseeable occasions.

Mr Doka had been evicted from a secure tenancy because of rent arrears and accepted that he had thereby become intentionally homeless. He later occupied a room in his former employer’s home for about two years, paying rent, but was required to leave the room when the employer’s son returned home.

After Mr Doka became homeless again, the local authority decided that his later homelessness remained intentionally caused and owed only the restricted duty under section 190 of the Housing Act 1996. The reviewing officer upheld that decision, and the County Court dismissed Mr Doka’s appeal under section 204. The central issue was whether the room constituted settled accommodation capable of breaking the causal link.

The appeal was dismissed. Lord Justice Patten gave the judgment, and Lord Briggs of Westbourne agreed.

1. Statutory inquiries. Under the Housing Act 1996, intentional homelessness requires both satisfaction of the deliberate-cessation test in section 191 and a finding that the applicant’s present homelessness was caused by that conduct. The second inquiry arises under section 193(1) and requires a continuing causal connection. The court applied the but-for approach recognised in Haile v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2015] UKSC 34, while recognising that a later unconnected or involuntary event may supersede the earlier conduct.
2. Settled accommodation. Settled accommodation may break the causal chain. The distinction between settled and temporary accommodation is a question of fact and degree. The applicant must show occupation under a licence or tenancy which, at its outset or during its term, had a real prospect of continuing for a significant or indefinite period. The relevant comparison is whether the move placed the applicant in a more precarious position than before. Legal form is not decisive; terms, exclusivity, the licensor’s rights, the relationship between the parties, the nature of the accommodation and the expected and actual duration may all be relevant.
3. Duration and precariousness. The length of occupation is not conclusive. Accommodation may remain precarious despite lasting two years or more, particularly where its finite duration was known from the beginning, the licensor retained priority, or the applicant had to vacate intermittently. Conversely, a new assured tenancy with a genuine prospect of renewal may ordinarily constitute settled accommodation, although no fixed period automatically qualifies.
4. Application. The reviewing officer considered the material facts and was entitled to regard Mr Doka’s arrangement as an intermittent and precarious licence. The employer’s son had priority to use the room, Mr Doka had to stay elsewhere on those occasions, and the arrangement was always understood to end when the son completed university. The two-year duration did not establish settled accommodation. The reviewing decision disclosed no error of law.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 17 October 2017, the court dismissed the appeal. [2017] EWCA Civ 1532
• County Court at Central London: Mr Recorder Hancock QC dismissed Mr Doka’s appeal under section 204 against the review decision by order dated 29 April 2016.
• Local authority review: On 20 February 2015, the reviewing officer upheld the decision that Mr Doka was intentionally homeless and owed only the restricted duty under section 190 of the Housing Act 1996.