Nwakamma & Ors v Umeyor

Section 1 of the Defamation Act 2013 requires a claimant to prove, as a matter of fact, that publication caused or was likely to cause serious harm to reputation. The court must assess the meaning of the words together with their actual impact, the circumstances of publication, the claimant’s situation and the inherent probabilities. Serious harm may be inferred, but publication to a small audience and disbelief by recipients may be important. A claim based on later republication must be pleaded. For harassment, two acts may constitute a course of conduct, but the conduct must be grave, oppressive and unacceptable rather than merely unpleasant or unreasonable.

The three claimants, office-holders or former office-holders of an unincorporated community association, sued for libel and harassment. They relied on two publications by the defendant: January 2017 emails and letters repeating allegations contained in an earlier text message, and a March 2017 email alleging that the first claimant had lied to the court in earlier costs proceedings.

The claimants alleged that the first publication had been circulated to 31 people and that both publications caused serious reputational harm. They also sought damages under section 3(2) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. The central issues were the extent of publication, the meanings conveyed, serious harm, whether later republication could be relied upon without pleading it, and whether the defendant’s conduct amounted to harassment.

1. Libel. The claimants failed to prove serious harm under section 1(1) of the Defamation Act 2013. The first publication reached only a small number of people. The evidence indicated that recipients generally treated the allegations as nonsense, and the claimants’ evidence of reputational harm was exaggerated and unconvincing. Their continued socialising within the community also undermined the alleged impact. The first publication claims were therefore dismissed.
2. The pleaded meanings included allegations of blackmail, support for evil acts, suspected illegitimacy, impotence, borrowed sperm, adultery and lying to the court. The court found that the allegations concerning illegitimacy, impotence and sexual intercourse in a minister’s home were not defamatory when viewed objectively. The innuendo that the third claimant had been unfaithful to his wife was defamatory, but serious harm was not proved.
3. The second publication also failed the serious-harm test. Its circulation was limited to people familiar with the continuing dispute and there was no evidence from the first claimant that the publication had caused him harm. The claim was dismissed.
4. The claimants could not rely on republication through the later Eagle Eye newsletters. Such a claim had to be pleaded so that the defendant could understand and meet it. In any event, the evidence did not establish a sufficient causal connection.
5. The defendant could not rely on section 8 of the Defamation Act 2013 because he was not shown to have been the original author or publisher of the 2015 text message. An unpleaded section 10 defence was not considered.
6. Harassment. The two non-identical emails sent on different days were capable, on the specific facts, of amounting to two acts and therefore a course of conduct. The point was expressly left open for other cases. Nevertheless, the conduct was unpleasant and unattractive but not sufficiently grave, oppressive or unacceptable to cross the statutory threshold. The harassment claim was dismissed.