Secretary of State for the Home Department v JM & Anor

On a statutory review of terrorism prevention and investigation measures, the court must review whether the statutory conditions continue to be satisfied, applying judicial-review principles. Necessity includes proportionality and the practical effectiveness of each measure, including whether compliance is reasonable and practicable.

The Secretary of State may adopt a package of measures in the round and may lawfully impose more onerous measures than those ordered in earlier proceedings where the risk, intelligence or surrounding circumstances have materially changed. The welfare of affected children is a primary consideration of substantial importance, but it may be outweighed by the need to protect the public from terrorism. Pandemic conditions did not, on these facts, require relaxation of the measures.

The Secretary of State imposed 2019 TPIM notices on JM and LF, both assessed to be senior figures in Al-Muhajiroun. JM challenged the lawfulness of the notice and all measures. LF challenged the reporting and appointments measures and argued that the proceedings breached article 6, that the measures deprived him of liberty contrary to article 5, and that they frustrated Parliament’s intention in the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011.

The court reviewed the relevant conditions and measures. LF’s TPIM was revoked while the review was pending because he was in custody, but the court considered its lawfulness up to revocation. The central questions were whether the notices and measures were necessary and proportionate, and whether the procedural and Convention objections succeeded.

1. JM. Conditions A and B were satisfied. The court accepted that JM had continued to engage in terrorism-related activity, including conduct for the benefit of a proscribed organisation and conduct encouraging terrorism. The court did not need to identify each activity with a particular limb of section 4 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011.
2. Conditions C and D were also satisfied. The TPIM notice and each individual measure were necessary and proportionate. The overnight residence measure had a discrete protective function by physically distancing JM from London-based associates and limiting his ability to organise or attend private meetings. Other measures did not replicate that function.
3. The children’s welfare, particularly the needs of JM’s vulnerable child, was a primary consideration attracting substantial weight. It did not automatically prevail over the grave national-security risk. The Secretary of State had taken reasonable steps to facilitate family contact and could permit reasonable variations for emergencies.
4. The Secretary of State was not required to calculate proportionality by a mathematical comparison with earlier reporting requirements. She could lawfully depart from an earlier judge’s conclusions where circumstances and intelligence had materially changed. The Covid-19 pandemic did not require a different result.
5. LF. The TPIM was lawful until its revocation on 24 September 2020. The reporting and appointments measures were necessary and proportionate. Their frequency, considered with the surrounding national-security evidence, did not amount to a daytime curfew, deprivation of liberty, oppressive conduct or a breach of the statutory scheme.
6. The disclosure available to LF satisfied article 6. The justification for the reporting measure did not depend decisively on closed allegations concerning his earlier TPIM. The objections based on article 5 and the Padfield principle failed.
7. The court exercised none of its powers under section 9(5). JM’s TPIM notice continued in force. LF’s TPIM had been lawful until revocation.

First instance statutory reviews in the Administrative Court. JM’s TPIM notice continued in force. LF’s TPIM was revoked by the Secretary of State on 24 September 2020 and was held lawful until revocation.