JAMES WILSON v JAMES MENDELSOHN & Ors.

In determining the meaning of Facebook and Twitter publications, the court must adopt the perspective of the ordinary reasonable reader in the relevant medium. Social-media communications call for an impressionistic assessment, taking account of the whole publication and directly available context, without elaborate parsing or an avidity for scandal. The words actually used remain important.

A publication may combine statements of fact with an opinion based on those facts. Where the factual basis is apparent from the publication, the basis of the opinion is sufficiently indicated. A person who republishes a publication with an accompanying message may adopt the publication as a whole, rather than merely the opinion expressed in it.

The claimant brought claims in libel, misuse of private information, harassment and breach of data rights. The hearing concerned preliminary issues in the libel claim arising from a Facebook post and five Tweets which reproduced or referred to it.

The court was required to determine the natural and ordinary meaning of each publication, whether the meanings were defamatory at common law, whether the publications contained fact or opinion, and, where opinion was involved, whether its basis was indicated. The court determined the issues in relation to the first and third defendants; the claim against the second defendant had been affected by his death and subsequent settlement with his estate.

The court determined the preliminary issues in relation to the first and third defendants.

1. Approach to meaning. The publications were read, so far as possible, without the parties’ pleadings or arguments, to capture the immediate impression of the ordinary reasonable reader, following Tinkler v Ferguson [2019] EWCA (Civ) 819 and Millett v Corbyn [2021] EMLR 19. The court applied the established principles in Koutsogiannis v Random House Group Ltd [2019] EWHC 48 (QB); [2020] 4 W.L.R. 25 and Corbyn v Millett [2021] EWCA Civ 567; [2021] E.M.L.R. 19.
2. Social-media context. Applying Stocker v Stocker [2019] UKSC 17; [2020] A.C. 593, Monroe v Hopkins [2017] 4 WLR 68 and Riley v Murray [2021] EWHC 3437 (QB); [2022] E.M.L.R. 8, the court considered the character of Facebook and Twitter as fast-moving, conversational media. Context could include closely connected material likely to have been in the reader’s view or mind, but the court found that the wider Twitter conversation did not alter the meaning of the Third Defendant’s Tweet.
3. Facebook Post. The natural and ordinary meaning was that the claimant objected to a mother leaving her car engine running outside a junior school, banged on her car window, was rude, photographed her, her car and her daughter, retained the photograph, and thereby behaved in an unwarranted and worrying manner, as a weirdo and freak, amounting to harassment. The first sentence was fact; the second was opinion. The factual sequence clearly indicated the basis of the opinion. Both statements were defamatory at common law. The court rejected the proposed implication that the claimant was a paedophile.
4. Republished Tweets. Each Tweet containing the Facebook Post and an accompanying message bore the same essential meaning as the Post. The Second Defendant’s messages latched on to and repeated the allegations of inappropriate, eccentric and harassing conduct. The Third Defendant’s words endorsed the description of the claimant as weird. In each case, republication with the accompanying message amounted to adoption of the Post as a whole, not merely adoption of its opinion.
5. The court rejected any remaining contention that the meanings found were not defamatory. Counsel were directed to agree an order reflecting the determination; costs, the form of order and permission to appeal were reserved for further submissions.