City of London Corporation v John Bussandra

For intentional homelessness, “deliberately” refers to the act or omission causing the loss of accommodation. The applicant need not have intended, or foreseen, homelessness. Mental illness short of incapacity may nevertheless mean that conduct was not deliberate, including where it caused a temporary aberration or limited mental capacity. A significant contribution by a mental-health problem is not, by itself, sufficient. Review officers must apply the statutory test, have regard to the Homelessness Code of Guidance, and give intelligible reasons addressing the main issues. The Public Sector Equality Duty is assessed substantively: its express mention is neither necessary nor sufficient. A review decision is read benevolently, realistically and practically, but must show that the relevant statutory matters were properly considered.

Mr John Bussandra surrendered a housing-association tenancy in Brighton in January 2016 and later became homeless. The City of London Corporation accepted that he was homeless, eligible for assistance and in priority need, but decided that he had become homeless intentionally under section 191 of the Housing Act 1996. The review officer upheld that decision under section 202. On appeal under section 204, the County Court at Central London allowed Mr Bussandra’s appeal, finding that the review officer had applied the wrong test, given inadequate reasons for rejecting psychiatric evidence and paid insufficient regard to the Public Sector Equality Duty. The City appealed. The issues in the Court of Appeal were the correct approach to deliberateness, the adequacy of the reasons, and compliance with the equality duty.

1. Appeal allowed. The review decision was not shown to be unlawful, and the County Court’s decision was set aside.
2. Under section 191(1) of the Housing Act 1996, “deliberately” qualifies the act or omission which causes the applicant to cease occupying accommodation. It does not require an intention to become homeless or foresight that homelessness might result. The ordinary meaning applies. Lack of mental capacity can negate deliberateness, but mental illness is not confined to cases of contractual incapacity. Mental-health problems may include limited capacity or a temporary aberration. Conversely, it is insufficient merely that a mental-health problem played a significant role in the decision.
3. The Homelessness Code of Guidance is not legislation and cannot alter the meaning of section 191. However, section 182 requires authorities to have regard to it, and its guidance on incapacity, limited mental capacity and temporary aberrations can materially inform the review process.
4. The review officer was entitled to reject the submission that Mr Bussandra’s depression made him unable to rationalise and think clearly. Read in context, those expressions responded to the psychiatric evidence and did not replace the statutory test. The officer considered the medical evidence, the timing of the proposed move, the bank statements, Mr Bussandra’s ability to travel and communicate, and the evidence about abuse. The conclusion that he had deliberately surrendered the tenancy was therefore open to him.
5. Reasons need address the main issues and enable the reader to understand the decision. A benevolent, realistic and practical reading is required. The review officer gave sufficient reasons for rejecting Ms Pisaneschi’s opinions, even though the correctness of those conclusions was not itself the issue.
6. The Public Sector Equality Duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 is concerned with substance, not formula. It need not be expressly mentioned, but merely reciting it does not cure a failure to address the relevant disability and its effects. Here the review officer recognised the disability and considered its implications in detail when assessing both deliberateness and the reasonableness of continued occupation. The challenge therefore failed.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): appeal from the County Court at Central London allowed. The Court of Appeal held that the review decision under section 202 of the Housing Act 1996 was not flawed.
• County Court at Central London: appeal under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996 allowed, with the review decision treated as unlawful on grounds concerning deliberateness, reasons and the Public Sector Equality Duty.