Peter J Jackson v The Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police

A tribunal must identify the information actually conveyed in a whistleblowing disclosure. It may consider closely related passages in the same report and assess them in context and in the round, subject to common sense and proportionality. For a disclosure to a prescribed person under s.43F of the Employment Rights Act 1996, the worker must reasonably believe that the information and any allegation are substantially true. The assessment is qualitative: belief in the gist alone is insufficient, but a minor error need not be fatal. Delay, conduct and possible animus may inform whether the statutory beliefs were genuinely and reasonably held. A tribunal may depart from an agreed list of issues where the interests of justice require it; exceptional circumstances are not required.

Mr Jackson, a former senior police officer employed by Greater Manchester Police, claimed whistleblowing detriment and constructive automatic unfair dismissal. He said three lengthy reports sent to the Independent Police Complaints Commission, a prescribed person, contained 19 protected disclosures. The Employment Tribunal dismissed the claims, finding that none of the disclosures was protected and that Mr Jackson had not been constructively dismissed. Its reserved Reasons were sent on 12 February 2024.

Mr Jackson appealed in relation to six disclosures and the constructive dismissal finding. The main issues were whether the Tribunal could consider closely related material beyond the passages selected in the agreed List of Issues, whether it correctly assessed the substantial-truth requirement for disclosures to a prescribed person, and whether delay and conduct were relevant to the statutory beliefs. He also sought to add a new ground concerning the construction of s.43F.

The appeal was dismissed on all grounds.

1. Information disclosed and the List of Issues. The Tribunal was entitled to consider material in the reports closely related to the passages Mr Jackson relied on. It had to identify what was actually conveyed and assess it in context and in the round, using common sense and proportionality. It was not confined to the passages selected for the List of Issues, and the worker could not unilaterally fillet relevant content from a disclosure to a prescribed person. The Tribunal also acted fairly: Mr Jackson had an opportunity to address the additional material. In applying Mervyn v BW Controls Ltd [2020] IRLR 464, the EAT held that departure from an agreed List of Issues does not require exceptional circumstances; the question is whether it is in the interests of justice.
2. Substantial truth. Under s.43F of the Employment Rights Act 1996, a worker must reasonably believe that the information disclosed and any allegation contained in it are substantially true. The test is qualitative, not a percentage calculation. Belief in the gist alone is insufficient, but a lack of belief in a minor aspect need not defeat a disclosure. The Tribunal had not applied a “95% true” test and was entitled to find that Mr Jackson lacked a reasonable belief in the substantial truth of important allegations. The EAT adopted the analysis in Korashi v Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Local Health Board [2012] IRLR 4.
3. Conduct and belief. A tribunal may consider delay and other conduct when deciding whether a worker genuinely and reasonably held the beliefs required by s.43B, including a belief that disclosure was in the public interest. Muchesa v Central & Cecil Housing Care Support UKEAT/0433/07 and Simpson v Cantor Fitzgerald Europe [2021] ICR 695 supported the relevance of conduct inconsistent with an asserted belief. The Tribunal’s conclusions were factual and evaluative, not perverse. It was also entitled to consider animus when assessing whether a belief was genuinely held or reasonable; that did not introduce a separate good-faith test.
4. Proposed new ground. The EAT refused permission to amend the grounds to raise a new point on s.43F. It was not within the existing ground, had not been argued below, and was raised late. The EAT considered the proposed construction to be without merit, while making clear that its discussion was not needed to determine the existing grounds.
5. Constructive dismissal. Those grounds were academic because no protected disclosure had been established. In any event, the Tribunal made no error of law in finding no resignation in response to a repudiatory breach, no relevant last straw, and affirmation of the contract.

1. Employment Appeal Tribunal Dismissed the appeal on all grounds: [2026] EAT 112 .
2. Employment Tribunal Dismissed the whistleblowing and constructive dismissal claims in reserved Reasons sent on 12 February 2024. A citation for that decision is not stated in the judgment.