Saidali Khakimov v Amova Asset Management UK Limited

For a claim under section 15 of the Equality Act 2010, a tribunal must distinguish between the employer’s subjective reason for the unfavourable treatment and the objective question whether that reason was something arising in consequence of disability. The alleged reason need not be the sole or main cause, but it must have had a significant, rather than trivial, influence on the treatment.

An Employment Tribunal will ordinarily be entitled to decide a case by reference to an agreed list of issues. It need not investigate and formulate a wider case that a represented claimant first advances in closing submissions. A challenge to factual evaluation, proportionality, or the weight given to evidence will not succeed unless the high perversity threshold is met.

The claimant, who had Functional Neurological Disorder, appealed the London Central Employment Tribunal’s dismissal of his claims for discrimination arising from disability and unfair dismissal. His employment had ended after almost 21 months of sickness absence, during which he had declined to provide the respondent with medical material or to engage with proposed occupational-health arrangements.

The agreed list of issues identified the relevant consequence of disability as difficulty with multi-layered thinking, unclear responsibilities and uncertainty about allocated roles. The Tribunal found that the dismissal was instead for capability reasons, including prolonged absence, business impact, lack of a return prospect, and the absence of medical information on alternatives.

On appeal, the claimant challenged that causation finding, the alternative proportionality and unfair-dismissal conclusions, and sought late permission to add a procedural ground concerning the list of issues.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Employment Tribunal applied the correct approach to section 15(1)(a) of the Equality Act 2010. It was required first to identify the respondent’s actual reason or reasons for dismissal, including conscious and unconscious reasons, and then to determine objectively whether an identified reason was something arising in consequence of disability. The Tribunal permissibly found that the specified cognitive difficulties and uncertainty were not an effective reason for the dismissing officer’s decision.

2. The claimant’s reliance on the possibility of causal links between disability and treatment confused the two distinct causation inquiries. The possibility of a multi-link objective connection between disability and the “something” did not remove the need to establish that the specified “something” significantly influenced the employer’s decision.

3. The Tribunal was entitled to confine the section 15 claim to the agreed list of issues. The claimant’s proposed reliance, first articulated in closing submissions, on incapacity for work as a different “something arising” was a reformulation of the case. It was fairly refused, given the detailed procedural history, the claimant’s engagement with the list, and counsel’s unequivocal confirmation at the hearing’s outset that it fairly identified the issues.

4. In any event, the alternative conclusion that dismissal was a proportionate means of achieving legitimate aims was not perverse. The Tribunal gave detailed and sustainable reasons, including the extended absence, expired sick pay, business prejudice, the claimant’s refusal to provide medical evidence or cooperate with occupational-health proposals, and the absence of a practicable alternative role. The alleged concession that it was probably an oversight not to revisit the insurer did not require a different result. The Tribunal was entitled to be presumed to have considered relevant evidence not expressly rehearsed in its reasons.

5. The unfair-dismissal conclusion was likewise unassailable. Capability was the principal reason, the process was fair, and dismissal fell comfortably within the range of reasonable responses. Permission to add the late procedural ground was refused: there was no adequate explanation for delay and no fairly arguable serious procedural irregularity or injustice. The respondent’s cross-appeal did not require determination.

• Employment Appeal Tribunal: Appeal dismissed in [2026] EAT 47. Permission to add a further ground was refused.
• London Central Employment Tribunal: Reserved liability judgment promulgated on 7 November 2023. The Tribunal dismissed the section 15 disability-discrimination and unfair-dismissal claims on their merits; other claims were withdrawn or were outside its jurisdiction.