Capital & Counties plc v Hampshire County Council (Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Great Britain) v West Yorkshire Fire and Civil Defence Authority, Digital Equipment Co Ltd v Hampshire County Council)

A fire authority owes no common-law duty merely to answer an emergency call, attend a fire, take control of operations, or attempt to extinguish the fire. Those matters do not, without more, create the proximity or assumption of responsibility required for a duty of care.

Liability may nevertheless arise where the brigade's positive negligent act creates a new danger or materially increases an existing danger. The recoverable loss is the additional damage caused by that intervention.

Fire Services Act 1947 section 30 authorises entry and other acts that would otherwise be trespass. It does not confer immunity for negligent fire-fighting. Section 13 imposes a public, administrative duty concerning water supplies and does not create a private action for damages.

Four consolidated appeals concerned loss caused by fires and the circumstances in which fire authorities could be liable to owners or occupiers of affected premises.

• In the Hampshire claims, the fire authority appealed against findings that its officer negligently turned off an operating sprinkler system, allowing a contained fire to spread and cause additional damage.
• In the London Fire Brigade claim, Rougier J had held on a preliminary issue that attendance at a reported fire did not create a duty to inspect neighbouring premises or eliminate all residual risk.
• In the West Yorkshire claim, Judge Crawford QC struck out claims in negligence and for breach of statutory duty arising from unavailable or undiscovered hydrants.

The common questions were whether a brigade owed a duty before or after attendance, whether its statutory powers created immunity, and whether section 13 of the Fire Services Act 1947 gave an injured person a private right of action.

1. All four appeals were dismissed. Lord Justice Stuart-Smith delivered the single judgment of the court. The Hampshire authority remained liable for the additional fire damage. The claims against the London and West Yorkshire authorities failed.

2. A fire authority has no common-law duty to answer a call for assistance or to take reasonable care in answering it. Nor does its attendance, control of operations, or fire-fighting activity alone create a sufficiently proximate relationship with the owner, occupier, or persons whose premises may be affected. The court applied the ordinary approach to duty and rejected both general reliance and an assumption of responsibility in that setting.

3. The Hampshire claim fell within a different and established category. A rescuer or protective service is liable where its positive negligence creates a new danger or substantially increases the existing danger. The authority disabled sprinklers which were containing the fire before its crews could fight it effectively. That action caused the fire to spread and made the authority liable for the resulting additional loss. Causation was tested by comparing the actual outcome with the position had the sprinklers remained in operation, not by assuming that the brigade would have done nothing after attending.

4. Fire Services Act 1947 section 30 authorises forcible entry and necessary interference with private rights for fire-fighting purposes. Its language removes liability for what would otherwise be trespass. It does not expressly or by necessary implication permit negligent exercise of the powers or immunise a fire authority from negligence claims.

5. Section 13 requires reasonable measures to secure an adequate water supply for fire-fighting. Read in its statutory context, it establishes a general administrative and public-welfare duty. It does not protect a limited class or evince an intention to create a private right to damages for breach. The West Yorkshire statutory claim therefore disclosed no cause of action.

6. The trial judge's finding that the Hampshire officer was negligent under the Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee standard could not be disturbed. Turning off the sprinklers before the fire was extinguished was an error no reasonably informed and competent fire officer could make on the reasons advanced.

7. The court added, obiter, that if sufficient proximity had existed in the London and West Yorkshire claims, policy considerations would not have justified a general fire-service immunity. The police-investigation cases were not closely analogous.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): all consolidated appeals dismissed in [1997] QB 1004.
• Official Referee, Judge Havery QC: found the Hampshire authority liable for negligently disabling the sprinkler system; its appeals were dismissed.
• High Court, Rougier J: held on a preliminary issue that the London Fire Brigade owed no duty of care on the agreed facts; the claimant's appeal was dismissed.
• High Court, Judge Crawford QC: dismissed the West Yorkshire claim, holding that section 13 created no private action and that no common-law duty arose; the claimant's appeal was dismissed.