Atanas DJUMALIEV v Mohammed Rashid MURADI

Drivers on a major road retain a duty to take reasonable care, while drivers emerging from a minor road owe a continuing duty to give way. The emerging driver must take account of restricted visibility and the commonplace possibility of speeding traffic, but is not required to anticipate every form of folly. What reasonable care requires depends on the junction and circumstances; a driver may need to edge forward and recheck the road before entering it.

Apportionment requires assessment of each party’s culpability and the causative potency of their fault. Prior road-accident decisions guide that assessment but do not create a tariff. The court apportioned responsibility 75% to the driver whose deliberate, excessive speed created the emergency and 25% to the driver who entered the major road without adequate observation.

The claimant, Atanas Djumaliev, was turning right from a minor road in Knightsbridge when his BMW collided with the defendant Mohammed Muradi’s Range Rover. Muradi had deliberately accelerated to 51 mph on a 20 mph urban road. The Range Rover mounted the pavement after the collision and injured two pedestrians. Muradi admitted negligence. The parties had agreed quantum, subject to the court’s liability findings.

The court had to decide whether Djumaliev was also negligent, whether that negligence caused or contributed to the collision and the pedestrians’ injuries, and how responsibility should be apportioned. The parties agreed that one apportionment would apply to both the vehicle losses and the consequences for the pedestrians.

1. Muradi’s deliberate acceleration to a peak of 51 mph in a 20 mph limit was negligent and causative. When a view of the BMW opened, he was travelling too fast to stop before the collision. His speed also materially increased the danger to pedestrians and the severity of their injuries.

2. Djumaliev was also negligent. A driver emerging from a minor road owes a continuing duty to give way. Priority on the major road does not remove that driver’s own duty of care, and an emerging driver must allow for the commonplace possibility that traffic will be speeding. The driver need not anticipate every form of folly.

3. On these facts, Djumaliev’s fleeting view and 32-metre sightline did not justify turning continuously into the westbound lane without looking left again. Reasonable care required him to wait for a gap that allowed him to edge forward, improve his view and remain ready to stop. That conclusion was fact-specific and did not impose a universal duty to make an interim stop at every junction. His failure to refresh his observation was causative: he could have seen the Range Rover and stopped before entering its lane.

4. Under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 and the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978, apportionment involved comparing culpability and causative potency. Muradi was more culpable because his speeding was deliberate and grossly excessive. His speed also turned a manageable traffic situation into an emergency and increased the consequences for the pedestrians. Djumaliev’s manoeuvre nevertheless brought the vehicles into conflict and contributed to the Range Rover leaving the carriageway.

5. The court apportioned responsibility 75% to Muradi and 25% to Djumaliev. The court observed that different apportionments might be possible in principle where the damage considered under the two Acts differs, but that question did not arise because the parties had agreed to treat the collision and its aftermath as one incident. Expert calculations assisted the factual analysis but were not a fixed framework for judging reasonable care.