(1)If, on an application made by the Attorney General or the Lord Advocate under this section, the Appeal Tribunal is satisfied that a person has habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground—
(a)instituted vexatious proceedings, whether before the Certification Officer, in an employment tribunal or before the Appeal Tribunal, and whether against the same person or against different persons, or
(b)made vexatious applications in any proceedings, whether before the Certification Officer, in an employment tribunal or before the Appeal Tribunal,
the Appeal Tribunal may, after hearing the person or giving him an opportunity of being heard, make a restriction of proceedings order.
(2) A “restriction of proceedings order” is an order that—
(a)no proceedings shall without the leave of the Appeal Tribunal be instituted before the Certification Officer, in any employment tribunal or before the Appeal Tribunal by the person against whom the order is made,
(b)any proceedings instituted by him before the Certification Officer, in any employment tribunal or before the Appeal Tribunal before the making of the order shall not be continued by him without the leave of the Appeal Tribunal, and
(c)no application (other than one for leave under this section) is to be made by him in any proceedings before the Certification Officer, in any employment tribunal or before the Appeal Tribunal without the leave of the Appeal Tribunal.
(3)A restriction of proceedings order may provide that it is to cease to have effect at the end of a specified period, but otherwise it remains in force indefinitely.
(4)Leave for the institution or continuance of, or for the making of an application in, any proceedings before the Certification Officer, in an employment tribunal or before the Appeal Tribunal by a person who is the subject of a restriction of proceedings order shall not be given unless the Appeal Tribunal is satisfied—
(a)that the proceedings or application are not an abuse of the process , and
(b)that there are reasonable grounds for the proceedings or application.
(5)A copy of a restriction of proceedings order shall be published in the London Gazette and the Edinburgh Gazette.
Cases considering section 33 14
[2026] EAT 34 · 3 March 2026Interprets
Section 33(1) establishes threshold conditions for a restriction order. The tribunal held that vexatious proceedings and applications, habitual and persistent conduct, and absence of reasonable grounds had all been proved objectively. (see paras [7]-[16]; [80]-[88])
The tribunal applied the limb concerning institution of vexatious proceedings. The extensive history of unsuccessful and improperly conducted claims supported its conclusion that this condition was satisfied. (see paras [8]-[16]; [84]-[88])
The tribunal applied the limb concerning vexatious applications and construed its wording as confined to applications made by the person subject to the order. Its omission of language extending to proceedings instituted by another meant that the tribunal could not restrict Ms Messi from acting as a representative or McKenzie friend. (see paras [6]; [92])
The tribunal ordered that no new proceedings may be instituted in an Employment Tribunal or the Employment Appeal Tribunal without permission. (see para [93])
The tribunal ordered that proceedings instituted before the order may not be continued without permission. (see para [93])
The tribunal ordered that no application, other than an application for permission under section 33, may be made without permission. (see para [93])
The tribunal exercised the statutory power to make the restriction order without a specified end date. It therefore made the order for an indefinite duration. (see paras [89]; [93])
The tribunal explained that the leave mechanism acts as a judicial filter. Future proceedings with potential merit may proceed, whereas claims lacking potential merit will not receive permission. (see para [91])
[2025] EAT 168 · 13 November 2025Defines
The Tribunal applied the statutory threshold and found that Dr Mallon had habitually and persistently, and without reasonable ground, instituted vexatious proceedings. It then exercised the discretion to make an order. (see paras [45]; [49])
The Tribunal explained that the order requires leave for existing or future proceedings and applications. It treated this mechanism as an initial merits and abuse-of-process filter rather than a bar to litigation. (see paras [2]-[3]; [50])
The Tribunal applied the discretion concerning duration. It held that the choice between an order for a specified period and an indefinite order must be made proportionately on the facts, and ordered an indefinite restriction. (see paras [52]-[56])
The Tribunal applied the leave criteria as the safeguard preserving access to justice. Leave may be granted only where proposed proceedings are not abusive and have reasonable grounds. (see paras [3]; [43]; [50])
[2022] EAT 35 · 25 February 2022
Section 33 requires habitual and persistent institution of vexatious proceedings or applications without reasonable grounds before an RPO may be made. Once those conditions are met, the EAT retains a discretion, which it exercised in favour of an indefinite order. (see paras [4]-[5]; [13]; [107])
What each judgment says about section 33 is in the case-law panel in the full Act.