Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, Schedule 9, paragraph 36

SCHEDULE 9 Special Provisions as to certain Orders

36 (1) On any application under this Part of this Schedule the court—

(a) may, by interim order, suspend the operation of the order to which the application relates, or of any provision of that order, until the final determination of the proceedings; and

(b) if satisfied that the order, or any provision of the order, is not within the relevant powers, or that the interests of the applicant have been substantially prejudiced by failure to comply with any of the relevant requirements, may quash the order or any provision of the order.

(2) An order to which this Part of this Schedule applies, or a provision of any such order, may be suspended or quashed under sub-paragraph (1) above either generally or so far as may be necessary for the protection of the interests of the applicant.

Definitions used in Schedule 9, paragraph 36 2

the relevant powers

(a) “the relevant powers”, in relation to any such order as is mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a) above, means the powers with respect to such an order conferred by this Act, and, in relation to a designation order, means the powers of sections 45, 46, 49, . . . and 53 of this Act, and

Defined in Sch.9 para.34(2) · see it in the full Act
the relevant requirements

(b) “the relevant requirements”, in relation to any such order as is mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a) above, means any requirement of, or of any instrument made under, any provision of this Act with respect to such an order, and, in relation to a designation order, means any requirement of sections 45, 46, 49, . . . and 53 of this Act or of Parts I to III of this Schedule or of any regulations made under Part III of this Schedule.

Defined in Sch.9 para.34(2) · see it in the full Act

Cases considering Schedule 9, paragraph 36 15

Daniel Adams v North Somerset Council

[2026] EWHC 1883 (Admin) · 23 July 2026Limits

The court applied paragraph 36 to determine whether the admitted procedural breach justified quashing the TRO. Substantial prejudice was required. (see paras [52]; [105]-[112]) The court noted the power to suspend an order by interim order, although no interim relief was sought. (see para [52]-[53]) The court applied the requirement of substantial prejudice before quashing for failure to comply with a relevant requirement. (see paras [52]; [106]-[112]) The court noted that any quashing could be limited to what was necessary to protect the applicant’s interests, but concluded that no quashing was justified. (see para [52])

Green Lane Association Limited & Anor v Central Bedfordshire Council

[2026] EWHC 26 (Admin) · 12 January 2026

The court applied the power to quash where the order was outside the relevant powers or the applicant’s interests had been substantially prejudiced by non-compliance with relevant requirements (see paras [30]-[31], [76], [102], [129]-[130]).

Emma Rose (on behalf of Friends of Mill Road Bridge 2) v Cambridgeshire County Council

[2025] EWHC 1715 (Admin) · 8 July 2025

Applied to the reasons why quashing could occur for non-compliance with relevant requirements only where the applicant’s interests had been substantially prejudiced. The court held that substantial prejudice was not established (see paras [27], [96] and [106]).

What each judgment says about Schedule 9, paragraph 36 is in the case-law panel in the full Act.

Amendments and notes

1 notes from legislation.gov.uk

Modifications

  1. C350Sch. 9 para. 36 applied (with modifications) (3.11.1994) by 1994 c. 40, ss. 34(8), 82(3)